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It is now more than 20 years since Bernard Schaffer
published his celebrated article, 'The Deadlock in
Development Administration'. His main object of
attack was the body of thought that went under that
name. In his view development administration had
rightly argued the distinctiveness of the administration
problem in the Third World: the coexistence of
extensive needs, growing demands for state output
after independence, a low level of administrative and
executive capacity within the state, and a range of
severe obstacles in the way of the new developmental
orientation and service delivery. What they had got
wrong was their view of the nature of administration.
The panaceas of central planning, public service
training, technical assistance for public administration,
and community development were each flawed or
inadequate to the problems in hand. He was particularly
vigorous against community development - which in
spite of its grass roots practices, he saw as top down
romanticism, a political rather than an administrative
movement, and one which often encouraged local
conflicts rather than healing them.
What also comes over forcibly is Schaffer's attack on
the bureaucratic bequest of colonialism. This was only
one style of administration among many. Its roots lay in
19th century metropolitan public service reform. Its
advantages were its stability, its continuity, the lack of
arbitrariness in its procedures for allocation, and the
space it allowed for the expert. Its weakness lay in the
difficulty it had in coping with uncertainty, with non-
routine functions, and diffuse and unstandardized
situations. These were the very features that
characterized post colonial societies.
Executive officers - of whom there were anyhow too
few - were faced with making critical decisions, rather
than applying standardized rules. Like the machine as a
whole they could handle repetition but not innovation,
and it was innovation that was required. None of
development administration's panaceas addressed this
problem. The very concept of central planning was a
product of the bureaucratic model itself. Technical
training would merely prepare better bureaucrats.
Community development was a political mobilization
against it. The fundamental structural problem of
development administration remained untouched -
the bureaucratic model itself. This was the deadlock.
In this, as in his other work, Schaffer's strength was as a
critical theorist. He was a deconstructor, a post
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structuralist before his time. His writings are full of
attacks on rationalist plans for administrative re-
organizations, devised on the basis of abstract
principles by people outside the machinery of
government. For him the model of bureaucratic
rationalism was doubly inappropriate for developing
countries, first because of its bureaucratic structure,
and secondly because of its rationalism. In matters of
administration says Schaffer (after Simon), statements
of principle are 'essentially useless'. He is not a son of
the Enlightenment.
Rather, in his approach to administration - if not in
his politics - he was a Burkean. In reforming the
machinery of government, 'the work should be
conservative'. It should be carried out by officials who
know the system and what can be done. 'Good work is
what is effective and, therefore, what is acceptable'.
Those who are successful will be something between a
diplomat and an anthropologist of departmental
rituals. There should be no search for precision. Even
the transfe' of experience from case to case is
problematic. Worthwhile work will not rely on
metaphor - either for its questions or its answers -
but rather will take the problems as they come.
The above are taken from one of his early papers on The
Theory and Practice of Government, but their tenor
reflects what was to remain his basic approach. He
favoured signposts and lists of possibilities, things to
lookout for, rather than universals. Such lists should be
drawn from particular histories and systems. They
should be part of a continuous adjustment to
administrative systems not discontinuous reform.
The distinct contribution he made in his development
writings was in the lists he suggested. Here is one such,
drawn from a paper on The Meanings of Development
Administration:
1 Designing organizational structures which, unlike
administrative or centrally dominated departmental or
secretarial forms, emphasize field, project, executive,
specialist or area elements.
2 New ways of organizing for representation,
participation or conflict.
3 Alternative public service career structures to give
greater expression to the prestige of the field and the
project.
4 Alternative forms of district organization and of
organizing the relations between market towns and
rural areas.
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5 Alternatives to hierarchical and pyramidal
organizational structures.
6 New forms of consultancy process.
7 Inherent rather than extrinsic, occasional or devised
forms of control or evaluation.
8 Ways of employing destabilizing and anti
institutionalized processes.
9 The implications of seeing administrative action and
especially the relations between administrative organi-
zations and clients as inherently an educational and
training process.
Embedded here are already those administrative issues
on which Schaffer directed his spotlight: the relation
between the executives of the state and the citizen; the
consequent importance of the front line state workers,
relative to the centre; the importance of anti-
hierarchical structures; questions of administrative
information systems, of accounting and the audit; of
accountability and democracy; of innovation; and f
what would now be called 'the wage relation', the terms
of contract and career structure of those employed by
the state.
In all of these he brought a sharp shift from the
traditional liberal theory of government, with its clear
division between the legislative and the executive,
between policy and implementation, and thus between
politics and administration. For Schaffer administration
was part of politics, just as politics necessarily implies
administration. 'Politics is decision making in an
organizational context and through organization'.
Representative democracy was only one form of
accountability. Conflicts can be resolved in places other
than parliaments. In line with his warning against
liberal rationalism, he urged that we should start always
from where we are, with what we have in hand, and not
from some abstract model of where we would like to be.
'The study of organization is not at all the Leninist
question of what is to be done, but the more
complicated and less certain question of what can be
done'. It was a warning as much to the World Bank or
the Chicago School as to successful revolutionaries. It
reflects what we might call his Burkean Fabianism.
Schaffer's problematics are still relevant and too little
heeded. The main structures of government and of the
national and international aid agencies are still
hierarchical and pyramidal. The field officer lacks the
prestige of the bureaucrat. The philosophy and practice
of consultancy, and of much administrative training,
remains much as it was. Above all, there is the same
enduring tension between form and function for a
developmental bureaucracy. On the one hand it has its
formalized routines and inflexible structures. On the
other it is required to undertake entrepreneurial tasks,
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in an unpredictable environment, with resources that
are dwarfed by the needs of its citizens. In this sense
there is still a deadlock in development administration.
On the other hand the past decade has witnessed a wave
of rationalistically inspired 'destabilizing and anti-
institutionalization processes'. The rationality in
question is that of neo-liberalism. If Schaffer invokes
Burke, the neo-liberals cite Smith and the utilitarians.
But their Smithian roots are those of the Wealth of
Nations rather than the Moral Sentiments, and their
utilitarianism that of Spencer rather than Mill. Their
preferred forms have been those of the market -
dismantling the state, sub-contracting its functions,
introducing competition, charging for services, opening
up state labour to the discipline (and incentives) of the
market. Their preferred agents have been private
capital and the private person. The drive for
individualism has been methodical as well as
methodological. In the First, Second and Third
Worlds, the principles of association have been on the
defensive and the state under siege.
The limitations are already evident from the practice of
privatization and the forward march of the market into
the interior of the state. Adequate contractual know
how, quality control, asset depreciation, wage cutting,
health and safety practices, the loss of socially oriented
services to those that prevailing distributions of income
command on the market, the fragmentation of services,
the redistribution of costs to the user - all these have
been issues of the liberalized public administration of
the 1980s. Many of these - and more - have been
problems for bureaucratic states themselves. It is in
principle possible to devise regulatory and contractual
arrangements which limit the problems. But practice is
not determined by theory alone. There is a politics as
well as an economics to privatization and the market,
and that politics has ensured that the use of the market
as the lodestar and administrative instrument of public
services has had for the most part a regressive impact on
both users and workers. The problems that gave rise to
the state in the first place are reappearing. What we
have learnt is that it is hard enough to enforce
regulations when there is public control. It is that much
harder when the barriers of property stand in between.
The terms of the debate in the last decade have been
between an old state and a new market. Schaffer's
alternative public path - of lists, and adjustments and
pragmatic diplomacy - has been swamped by the
onslaught on the state itself. What is needed is a new
model for public administration, one that can match
the Weberian model as a point of reference. Much
public administration literature has been concerned
with showing that this state or that did not conform to
Weber. But it was still Weber who was invoked, and
still Weberianism which informs so many constitutions
and practises in the Third World. It is the weaknesses
of that model which have been equated with the
weaknesses of the state. There need be no such
equation. The neo-liberal reforms have already
provoked public practices which suggest a new model.
The task is to formalize it.
NEW CORPORATE MODELS
One starting point is to consider the changes taking
place in corporations. The traditional model of the
large multi-divisional corporation was developed in the
80 years between 1850 and 1930. It started on the
railroads, spread to process industries such as steel and
chemicals, and was extended to complex assembly,
notably by Alfred Sloan of General Motors. These
were the years of bureaucratic development in Britain
and Germany (on the Prussian model) and of scientific
management in the organization of work in factory and
office. Like Weberian bureaucracies Sloanism had a
strong vertical hierarchy, employed standard pro-
cedures and systems, and was based on clear cut
functional specialization. Like Taylorism, it made a
sharp division between conception and execution, with
corporate planning like production planning placed in
the hands of specialists. It relied on pay and prospects
as incentives, paid the rate for the job not for the
person, and sought - through job design - to match
the principle of interchangeable parts with interchange-
able workers. Though it would grieve Sloan to hear it,
Sloan's organizational paradigm has come to be called
Fordist, as representing the adequate form for the mass
production age.
Corporate bureaucracy has its outstanding historian in
Alfred Chandler. His key point - and it is one that is
brought out well in a recent book by Michael Best - is
that this model hinges on a particular information
system. Seeking economies of throughput the large US
corporations developed statistical procedures that
allowed them to co-ordinate production, inventory
control and working capital with detailed forecasts of
short term demand. Their cost accounting techniques
also allowed them to decentralize operational
responsibility at the same time as maintaining
centralized planning and service functions. Chandler
sees these accounting and intelligence techniques as
more significant than Taylorism in the workplace, and
'one of America's most useful exports in an age when so
many nations are seeking the material benefits of a mass
production, mass distribution economy' (Chandler
1968: 277).
Chandler wrote this in the late 1 960s and a decade later
in The Visible Hand, he could still argue that the
modern enterprise was only an extension, if a more
sophisticated one, of the old model. Indeed he saw it
spreading as electronic technology allowed mass
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production techniques to be applied in many older
industries - airlines, communications, motion pictures,
man made fibres, paper and glass (Chandler 1977,
Chapter 14). It was the bureaucratic organization
which allowed the potential economies of scale of mass
production systems to be realized. Like Emma
Rothschild, he backed Sloan against Ford for prime
place in the gallery of innovators.
By the time The Visible Hand was published, Fordism
was already in trouble. UK and US mass producers
found themselves vulnerable to the macro instability of
the l970s, they faced widespread labour resistance, and
competition from Japan, Italy and Germany in world
markets. Some of this competition came from rival
Fordists - like Fiat and Volkswagen - but much from
enterprises that appeared to follow different organi-
zational principles. These principles echoed academic
work that for some years had pointed to the limits of
Sloanism, particularly in an age of unpredictability and
one in which a premium was being put on innovation.
Taken up in Business Schools and by management
consultants, the practices have been consolidated into a
new model, which stands much of Sloanism on its head.
In the accompanying chart I have laid out the main
contrasts between the old and the new. First, there has
been a move from closed to open systems. A closed
system is like a machine which operates with little
interplay with its environment. Between Sloan's
bureaucratic fortress and its surroundings lies a deep
moat. Suppliers are kept at arm's length. Consumers
are passive. Competitors are not to be trusted.
Vulnerable as they are to uncertainty (because of the
costs of surplus capacity) Sloanist firms have developed
ways of adapting their environment rather than
becoming adaptive to it (these methods have varied
from instalment credit, to standard cost accounting,
backward integration, and support for Keynesian
macro regimes).
Open systems operate in continuous interchange with
their environment. They are adaptive as much as
adapting. Organizationally this has meant close
collaboration with suppliers, consumers and com-
petitors. Each is seen as a source of innovation from
which the initial firm itself can benefit. Hence Bosch
requires its sub-contractors to work for others as well as
itself, Xerox encourages its employers to seek other
jobs, keeping links with Xerox through a retainer.
Japanese electronics companies choose suppliers on the
basis of their capacity for innovation and collaborative
working rather than on low cost tendering. For
management the task is not merely internal regulation,
but the management of the firm's inter relations with
its environment, scanning for changes, responding
strategically or in the words of the socio-technical
systems theorists, managing the boundaries.
Contrasting Models of Corporate Organization
Mechanistic
Closed system: adapting
internally oriented
passive consumers
arms length suppliers
competitive
Planning: pre-planning
concentrated at centre
detailed targets
imposed by centre
Organization: multi-layered pyramid
vertical flow of information and
command
unitary segmented organization
departmental specialization
role culture
organograms/job descriptions
centralization of operating
responsibility/rules and manuals
management role: planning,
organization command,
co-ordination, control,
organization as instrument
Labour: labour as cost
incentives through pay
strict hierarchies
rate for the job
high turnover
Taylorized: fragmented,
dc-skilled,
division of mental and manual work
Organic
Open system:
Strategy:
Network:
Staff:
adaptive
interplay of internal/external
user centred
close, long term supplier relations
collaborative networks
feedback from action
participative process
adjustable range of target within
constraints consensus
flat hierarchies
horizontal connectedness, through
project teams, task forces, matrix
methods
decomposed system
functional redundancy/duplication
task culture
clusters/project goals
workplace autonomy
management role: boundary
management system adjustment,
enabling, supporting, educating,
monitoring
organization as learning
labour as asset
incentives through quality of work
less inequality
incremental pay
lower turnover
multi skilling - 'requisite
variety'/group working
Secondly, there has been a change of view with respect
to the relation of planning and operations. The
traditional view was Taylorist: the planners setting the
course, deciding the targets, and specifying the manner
of execution. This was the outlook of F'rd (as it was of
Lenin). It is still strong today in the form of detailed
programming, management by objecti'es, or PPBS
techniques. It is the view from above, the architect's
plan, assuming a clear sight of the terrain of action, and a
measure of stability. Saul Steinberg, the head of the
conglomerate Leasco, used to fix targets jointly with
each manager. If they were met their salaries were
raised 50 per cent, if they fell short they were fired.
The alternative view applies to situations where these
conditions do not hold, where there is neither good
information nor stability. Targets then become frail
guides. The necessary knowledge will come through
action - in this sense implementation might even be
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seen to precede planning - and much will be held by
those directly involved in the action, the operators
rather than the planners. Faced with such ambiguity,
uncertainty and bounded knowledge, an organization
can only start with a general direction, an approach. It
will clarify a field of possible action within certain
constraints, and will determine its course through this
field in response to the experience of action and the
unfolding of events. In assessing the progress of an
R & D project a typical Japanese firm will first see how
its technology has developed, how the final markets
have changed, how the competitors are doing, whether
the research team is in good order, and only then will it
check on expenditure against budget. We can speak of a
strategy rather than a plan, a view from ground level
over the next ridge rather than a clear photograph from
the air. Both the making of the strategy and the process
of feedback from its pursuit in practice cannot be left to
specialist planners. For the operators must understand
the strategy as an approach rather than a set of rules,
and will themselves need to contribute to it. Each
operative needs to carry a planner's pencil in his or her
knapsack.
The process is one instance of a third, broader contrast
between the old and new, the structure of the
organization itself. The old system was planned by
specialists who laid out a clearly defined set of
specialized roles, each complementary to the other.
This is the world of organograms and detailed job
descriptions. There was a clear division between head
and hand, and few lateral relations between operators
and departments. Co-ordination and control was a
specialist and centralized responsibility. The movement
of information and orders was vertical rather than
horizontal. The layers of authority - 17 in the case of
Ford - made for a steep pyramid.
For Herb Simon the key problem in any organization
was incomplete information, or as he put it 'bounded
rationality'. Organizational hierarchy, departmental
and job divisions, plans, rulebooks, and standard
procedures all helped deal with decision making under
uncertainty. They were a system for organizing and
economizing on information. Computerized infor-
mation systems strengthened the capacity of these
traditional forms - allowing the size of organizations
to expand.
Japanese firms have taken a radically different view on
organizational structure. For them a Taylorized system
is an inadequate way of organizing information in an
open system and a turbulent environment. This is how
the point is put by Konosuke Matsuchita:
'We have passed the Taylor stage. We are aware that
business has become terribly complex. Survival is
very uncertain in an environment filled with risk,
the unexpected, and competition. . . We know that
the intelligence of a few technocrats - even very
bright ones - has become totally inadequate to face
these challenges. Only the intellects of all employees
can permit a company to live with the ups and
downs and the requirements of the new environment
We will win and you will lose. For you are not
able to rid your minds of the obsolete Taylorisms we
never had.' (Manufacturing Engineering 1988).
On the shop floor this means pushing specialist
production tasks like statistical production control,
maintenance, quality control, and even scheduling
down to the operators on the shop floor. It means
multi-skilling the workforce. In Hewlett Packard the
shift is reflected in the fact that in some of their
factories no one is now classed as an operative, even
though production is not fully automated. Specialists
are available - but to assist and advise. As a result one
of the first consequences of the Japanization of a factory
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is to remove many computers from the shop floor, since
they are processing information vhich should never
rise above shop floor level. The same principle applies
to plants and divisions. Layers of middle management
have been stripped out as an organization is
decomposed into its front line operating units.
The problem of such decomposition is co-ordination
between the separated units. Previously this was done
by management - they were the conductors of the
corporate orchestra. The emphasis now is on strong
horizontal linkages - 'connectedness' as it is called in
the organizational literature. Temporary project teams
are one way of doing this - and one mark of the new
form of organization. There are various forms of
internal networking - including the co-operative
development of strategy. Another approach is to limit
the need for co-ordination by developing a range of
specialisms within a single operating unit - a parallel
to the multi-skilling of the workforce. One term used is
the development of 'functional redundancy', that is to
say that each person or unit has more functional
capacities than can be used at any one time, thus adding
to their self sufficiency and therefore flexibility.
Gareth Morgan has suggested the term 'holographic' to
describe the new form of organization where each part
contains the capacity to act as the whole. Like the brain
itself, each part is both specialized and generalized, and
can switch specialism when the need arises. Another
image we could use would be that of a 'fractal'
organization, invoking the principles of fractal
geometry in which structures are repeated on finer and
finer scales, there is self similarity, pattern within
pattern, so that each part contains within it the form of
the whole, and itself has parts which also take this form.
Specialization is not abandoned, it is internalized. This
marks a break from the old organizational model.
Boundaries are now less sharp - each unit, if you like,
becomes a more open system. The boxes of an
organogram need to become mobile like an amoeba.
Job descriptions should guide but not confine. The
emphasis shifts from role to task - and the culture with
it.
A further consequence of the re-arrangement of
specialization is that there is scope for internal
pluralism. Units like individuals may work more or less
well. Innovation tends to thrive on diversity. The new
corporations now encourage overlap, work on similar
projects, and the breaking down of departments into
units doing the same thing. In the traditional
organization this would be called duplication. In the
market economy it is known as competition. Some
firms indeed have taken to internal tendering between
teams for particular tasks.
In these situations the task of senior management is to
judge. But it is of course much more than that. For
while it still exercises the final control function, its
work now is as much that of the gardener as the
mechanic: establishing the organizational culture, and
climate, putting the systems in place, managing the
boundaries, supporting the staff. This is epitomized by
one of the industrialists on a recent IDS study seminar
who, on his return, devolved all operating responsibility
on his deputy, and allocated half his day to working as
an internal consultant, and the other half to training the
workforce.
One way of looking at many of these practices is to say
that the new forms of organization are centred round
learning. This is the fourth point of contrast. The
traditional organization was instrumental. It was set up
to carry out certain tasks, and that was that. The image
was that of the machine - and it was an image that was
carried over to describe different types of organization
which grew alongside the Fordist firm: the political
machine, the machinery of government, your appli-
cation is somewhere in the machine. The very word
organization comes from the Greek for instrument.
The modern conception is quite different. Once
uncertainty and imperfect knowledge are introduced
then the machine image becomes inadequate, as it does
if an organization is expected to adapt to and learn from
its environment and its own functioning. It was Ford
himself who said that there could be no positive
knowledge without negative knowledge. Hence an
organizational culture must be such as to encourage its
members to take (reasonable) risks, must not penalize
failure, but be ready to learn from them. This sounds
more like an old proverb than a new principle, but its
significance can be judged from the Japanese attitude
to machine break down. Instrumental maintenance
seeks to mend the machine. The Japanese go a step
further and ask why the breakdown occurred, and how
the machine could be improved so that it does not break
down again.
There is also the question of how people learn. The
American management writer Tom Peters puts great
emphasis on learning from action, rather than
requiring too much detail before starting. It is the
contrast again between planning and strategy. It affects
training too. Training itself is a limiting word - it is
what is done to dogs, the teaching of tricks or good
habits. The French word 'formation' is more
appropriate, for it implies a sense of development. Like
suppliers, workers are to be assessed by their capacity
to learn, and to work creatively in the world of
uncertainty. Similarly we can ask of an organization
whether its members are learning from being in it, or
as is commonly the case - unlearning.
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The fifth and final point follows directly from the
fourth. It is that labour comes in from the cold. Seen no
longer as an interchangeable part, as a Taylorized
extension of the machine, it comes to be seen as the key
asset for a firm. Xerox have recognized this by trying to
construct sets of accounts which have labour as the
asset, and machinery as part of circulating capital. This
is also the case of football clubs, whose competitiveness
centres on their team of players. For firms in general, it
is the staff who embody the requisite variety of skills. It
is they who learn, who determine quality and who
innovate.
This has implications for the regime of labour. Taylor
placed central emphasis on the recruitment of labour. A
post-Taylorist would put greater weight on subsequent
development. Matsuchita's aim in this field is 'to
develop extraordinary qualities in ordinary people')
Poor organizations often achieve the opposite. One side
of a labour centred policy is a high percentage of
spending on staff development. It is a good index of the
new form of organization. Another side is a concern to
lower the labour turnover. Hence the growth of a range
of corporate welfare benefits from pensions, to
mortgage support, and various social facilities.
There has been a long history of empirical work on the
negative effects (from the viewpoint of capital as well as
labour) of the Taylor system. Workers respond
differently if they identify with what they are
producing, if they are given security, if they have some
stake in a firm, if they have scope and are recognized for
work done well. What would seem little more than a
trivial commonplace, are the tips of the iceberg of major
research, and are still contradicted by much traditional
organization. Those firms that depend on innovation
and creativity - from electronics firms and software
houses to design studios and the cultural industries -
are those which have been amongst the most innovative
in organization and labour policies.
To sum up, we can trace a move from a mechanical to
an organic model of the corporation. This is the
terminology of two of the pioneers of research in this
area, Burns and Stalker. Others have called the new
form 'brainlike', or 'integrative'. Then there is
'holographic' and 'fractal', or post rational, post
Fordist or post Modern. The terms are less important
than the substance.
I have described the substance in one way. I could have
drawn the contrasts under the five classical headings of
one of the fathers of Scientific Management, Henri
Fayol, for whom management involved: planning,
organization, command, co-ordination and control.
But these themselves reflect the mechanistic way of
looking at the problem, although all are still issues for
the organic firm. Where the new forms have emerged
most clearly - Japan, in the industrial consortia of the
Third Italy, in the networks of Baden Württemberg or
among the Scandinavian majors, the results are not a
corporate version of say a professional association or
university. There are still many of the features of the
old systems: targets, management information systems
allowing continuous monitoring and control, rates for
the job, even Fordist pockets within the wider
organization. But the main structures of the
organization have changed, as have their points of
focus, and the nature of their internal and external
relations. Their success and their spread now justifies
us calling them a new model.
FROM MECHANICAL TO ORGANIC
ADMINISTRATION
I have discussed only one aspect of corporate
administration, the material structures and processes of
the administration itself. There are other readings: the
labour process perspective and the structure of
administration from the viewpoint of labour control; an
industrial structure perspective linking size and
administrative structure to market position and the
degree of monopoly power; or the so-called contingency
perspective, relating type of administration to the
productive technology and the nature of the product.
All these are important - not least because
organizational literature tends to neglect the fact that
all corporate administration takes place within the
discipline of capital accumulation. The requirements of
accumulation are the politics which suffuse corporate
administration. The new methods are not neutral from
the point of view of labour, or the wider community.
Yet it is because of the discipline of market competition
that corporations have been driven to organizational
innovation, and our interest in the new practices is
because of their potential relevance for administration
in the public economy. Just as public administration in
the past has drawn heavily from the traditional forms of
corporate administration - Weber, Taylor and Fayol
were contemporaries with similar approaches - so we
may ask what value if any is there in the new corporate
administration for the public sphere.
The first point to make is that - whatever their
similarities - corporate and public administration
must be kept clearly distinct. The reason is that they
operate on two quite different principles: the first
allocates goods and money via the market, the secoi1d
by a mixture of levies and bounties. Defined in this way
the state lacks output prices, its management accounting
therefore faces quantitive handicaps, its services are not
subject to the discipline of the final market, nor
therefore is its labour. Indeed, in the Weberian model,
the labour contract is the converse of the private
market; jobs are guaranteed, appointment and
promotion takes place on the basis of input rather than
output (qualifications rather than performance), and
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there is a declared separation of the public and private
sides of labour.
With the market removed, resources and accountability
come in other ways, the one through tax, the other
through elected politicians. The economic circuit and
the political process - which were united in the market
- become separated structures in the public sphere.
For a public Weberian bureaucracy, structured on a
mechanical model, the consequences were as follows.
First it was even more closed as a system than the
Sloanist corporation. As private capital, the latter was
forced to relate to the environment: the final market,
the money market, and the product market. The grid of
value was laid over it daily. It might try and mould the
environment to its internal needs - but this meant
active strategy. The public bureaucracy was more
insulated, being dependent for its discipline on the
much blunter instrument of the periodic vote and the
instructions of politicians. Since neither the voters nor
the politicians had a choice of bureaucracy, public
administrators were further protected from external
pressures to change in ways which conflicted with the
interest and logic of the closed system. The same was
true of armies for whom war alone acted as a decisive
discipline for restructuring. We would expect
bureaucracies, resourced from a forced levy, to be more
producer dominated than a market bureaucracy.
One reflection of this is the greater weakness of the
users. The Weberian analysis looks at how state
officials secure control over citizens, sometimes
choosing goals that justify control, sometimes
justifying control by the goals. As Theo Mars points
out, people are either handed out free goods, or treated
as criminals to be coerced, or drawn into corrupt inter-
relations. 'Programmes came to focus on those who are
in the weakest and most vulnerable position, easily
dealt with because they have no alternative'. (Mars
1988: p 5). The terms and content of the service, and
what Mars calls 'the bureaucratic contact situation'
itself are moulded to the needs of the bureaucracy
rather than vice versa.
The tendency towards centralization in a mechanical
organization was further strengthened in public
bureaucracies by the modes of accounting and
accountability. The principles of accountability ran -
in the British case - through Parliament to Ministers,
to senior civil servants and downwards. Ministers were
responsible to Parliament for the actions of even junior
members of their departmental staff. This was the
origin of the Ministerial Department, and the suspicion
of quangos and boards in British constitutional history.
It provided an incentive for centralization, since
responsibility required oversight and the power of
confirmation.
At the same time the accounting systems which had
allowed the early American corporations to decentralize
to quasi independent divisions, were not available to
public bureaucracies. Public accounting could measure
inputs in money values, but not outputs. Consequently
there has been a bias towards control by inputs -
acknowledged as an inadequate measure of per-
formance, and hence unsatisfactory as a means
permitting the decentralization of operating
responsibility.
Finally the insulation from the market, the specialization
of function, and the terms of the labour contract,
encouraged a conservatism of performance and little
incentive for innovation or restructuring.
Many of these characteristics have been associated with
the state as against the market. My argument is that
they are, at root, features of the mechanical model of
organization. When this model takes the form of a
private corporation, the market serves to modify th
features. It creates openings in the closed system, it
permits some decentralization, and creates a force for a
measure of innovation and restructuring. However the
market has its own limitations and though the state
accentuates the weaknesses of the mechanical model, it
avoids many of the limitations of the market. We thus
return to this issue of whether there are forms of public
administration which, without resource to the market
and its limits, can move beyond the mechanical model,
and provide the basis for a flexible state?
I want to start with what is implied by thinking of the
state as an open system. It would mean that public
administration would become more interactive, more
responsive to its environment. The walls of the state
fortress would be dismantled and the moat filled in. A
prime focus would be the relations between the state
and the citizens it is meant to serve. This was the call of
Schaffer as it is of Mars, and it is of fundamental
significance.
What does it mean in practice? To begin with in
developmental as in some service functions it means
helping people to help themselves. It means conceiving
of the state-citizen relationship as an educational and
animating one, rather than one of service delivery.
Where the service is most effectively provided by the
state, there are many ways of making it responsive to
users. Popular planning is one way. The provision of
choice another. The strengthening of user groups is a
third. The latter have been of growing economic
importance in developed countries, both in monitoring
and pressing on performance, and in the determination
of the long term strategy of particular industries -
food, transport, chemicals, education, health. Some
public industries have now introduced consumer
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contracts with payments to customers for poor
performance. Others publicize performance targets,
and their rate of achievement. The techniques for
monitoring use and testing out potential use has been
little used by public services, but features of modern
retailing - EPOS, plastic cards, consumer surveys
are beginning to be adopted by public bodies with
surprising results. Plastic and intelligent cards in
particular - now widely used for commercial purposes
in the developing world - offer much scope for scrvice
provision and redistribution.
An open system attaches importance to the feed-back
from associated external partners - in this case users.
A strong user presence, resources for research, public
information, rights of appeal, formal legal protection
and regulatory codes, independently financed user
consultation committees are all necessary features of
the new public economy. It is sometimes suggested that
e a luxury for developing countries - a
ie'i of affluence and the consumer society. My
poi is that they are as important as internal
accounting systems for they provide a new form of
control, a source of innovation, and a means of
redressing the balance towards users in the public
sphere.
There is the further question of how the public
production system itself can be organized so that it can
respond to users, and perform efficiently. One
requirement is a new public accounting. The tradition
of public sector auditing has been cost based and
narrow. It is concerned with effectiveness (are the best
methods for meeting a need being used); efficiency (is
the chosen method being operated properly) and
economy, (are supplies being purchased at least cost).
In the UK, the Audit Commission studies of particular
services, and the Rayner scrutinies of central
government units and departments, lay their main
emphasis on good technical practice and narrow
economy. The production bias in the UK is so
pronounced that there are no publicly given volume
figures for the system of cash limits. The overriding
question is how spending relates to targets, not how far
targets are being met.
This needs to change. Output and performance figures
are required in much greater detail. There need to be
capacity utilization figures, costs per unit of output, as
well as fixed asset and labour asset accounting.
'Accounting shapes the realm of the visible' and it is
important that outputs as well as costs are made visible.
Additionally there need to be more qualitative
assessments of performance. Those coming from the
users side are one source. They can be supplemented by
regular public hearings, and enquiries.
There is also scope for performance audits, where the
auditors' task is as much advisory as disciplinary, (I
witnessed such a system working effectively within a
large Cypriot construction firm, which employed
foreign consultants primarily as auditors rather than
front line technicians).
To such measures of performance should be added a
capacity for flexible response. One type of market
response is bankruptcy and takeover. In a pluralist
state, closure would be less common. Rather the less
successful managers can be moved, and their tasks
taken over by the more successful, who should in turn
have trained up others to take over. This is the
Matsuchita method, where each year, instead of firing,
5 per cent of staff rotate between divisions according to
performance.
Another type of response is needed for the demand for
variety, or services/advice geared to particular needs.
This often requires cooperation with users and
knowledge of particular localities. It is aided by
operational decentralization and 'functional
redundancy'. Over the past ten years throughout
Western Europe there has been a wave of decentrali-
zation in local government. Some has been merely
locational, but increasingly it is administrative,
financial and political. Neighbourhood offices, cost
centre budgeting, one stop centres have all become
common in the pursuit of closer user relations and
rapidity and specificity of response. Here is a good
example of the fractal state, each part taking a similar
form to the organization as a whole, with their own
solicitors, accountants and administrators. The centre
provides specialist advice and servicing, and there has
been a considerable increase in inter-neighbourhood
contact (including measures of specialization).
An alternative form of decentralization has been
through contract. Some authorities have transformed
all their services into semi-autonomous corporations -
Direct Service Organizations, which bid for the work
not only of their own council but other public
authorities. This is a step towards the market model,
and is taken a step further when the contractor is a
private firm or voluntary organization. There are cases
- and countries - where this could be justified on
many counts, but the principal administrative
objection to it is the need to link strategy and
implementation closely together, to have senior
management working in support of the operating units,
and to maintain a perspective that does not divorce the
individual unit from the interest of the organization as a
whole.
The above are all examples of organizational flexibility.
There is also a question of technical flexibility. Just as
firms have developed smaller, flexible plants, so public
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services have experimented with small units - in
power generation for example - which do not require
so great an initial capital outlay, and which have
developed other ways of managing peak demand than
éxpanding capacity.
An open organization needs to be decomposed into
relatively independent sub units. But it also needs
composition - practises to ensure its wholeness, and,
in the public sector, to ensure its accountability. The
first part of composition I have already touched on -
public management information systems which record
output and performance characteristics as well as costs,
and have the means to assess qualitatively as well as
quantitatively. A second part is 'formation' the
establishment of a common culture, as well as the
necessary techniques for performance. In so many
cases this takes priority over all else - over new
accounting procedures, or changes in organizational
structure. For without a common outlook - the
perspective of an open system not a closed one, of
orientation to the user, and to other litanies of modern
corporations - quality, feedback, continuous
improvement - without these the other changes will
have only limited effect.
A third medium of composition is the strategic
planning process itself. It is one of the principles of the
new type of organization that those involved with
production not only share a common culture, but a
strategic perspective. It is important that each sub unit
not only thinks about the strategy for their unit but for
the organization as a whole. One of the mistakes in
decentralization is to have functional distinctions
according to layers of decentralization. For example, it
is often argued that local government should deal with
planning of their own activities within the locality,
regional government likewise, leaving national govern-
ment to make the national plans. This has traces of
Taylorism. For the local is also national, and it is the
composition of many local experiences and perspectives
which will give a richer strategy/plan than one devised
by people separated off from the diversity of
experiences. The same applies within an organization.
Planning should clarify constraints and determine
directions, and ft should involve both those within the
organization and the users affected by it. This is not a
call for populism. There is a skill in strategy, which has
to be learnt, and in which some will specialize. But it is a
skill which should be important in all 'formation' since
it provides the unitary perspective for particular tasks
How does all this leave accountability? First it should
be said that the liberal theory of accountability has been
in part responsible for the neglect of a wider
responsiveness. With stronger user control, and more
open and more detailed measures of performance, there
is already the promise of a major step forward in
substantive accountability. A second step would be to
increase user and worker representation in the
supervisory boards and committees of decentralized
services. But as with higher level politicians,
representatives would be helped by 'formation' in the
fields for which they are responsible. For if
administrators are in part politicians - through their
influence on decision making - so are politicians or
elected representatives in part administrators. They too
need to understand the service they oversee organically
rather than as a machine.
One implication of this is that a new form of
administration needs a new party and a new public.
Administration cannot be separated from either. It was
Weber who observed that the power of American urban
politicians was dependent on a weakly developed
public opinion. Any innovative, democratic admini-
stration needs an active public with which to inter-
relate. Greater user power is not enough - for the state
shapes demand as well as responding to it. Land use
planning affects the demand for transport. Security of
public transport, its scheduling and network, affects
the demand for transport modes. Supply is not
independent of demand. There are strategic issues
which require political decisions. In contemporary
liberal democracy the machinery of government, of
representation and the popular press focuses on
relations of power (coercion), allocation, and the details
of political and bureaucratic conduct. It is not geared to
strategy or the 'productive' potential of the public or
the state. Political parties - the political machines of
the 20th century - are structured round the
circulation of power. Production, and knowledge of
production is left to the economy regulated by a
distanced bureaucracy. Thus what is learnt within
political parties is the art of committees, resolutions,
and the forming of majorities. Little is learnt about the
issues of day to day production which should be the
subject of elected power.
The result of the above is that states have been less
effective as productive than as allocative and coercive
instruments. Yet it is the productive potential which is
important for development, and it is long term strategy
and innovation which is now so central to production.
This is why economic democracy has become such an
urgent issue. Until now the connection between the
economy and democracy has been through the liberal
model of representation. This has produced the oft
noted contrast between an elective politics and
dictatorship at the workplace. One response has been to
transport liberal democracy into the workplace by
electing management (as in the former Yugoslavia).
But though an advance this still seems to me to be
treating the workplace as a closed system, and
restricting the idea of democracy to electoral forms. As
in the political arena, votes are necessary but not
sufficient.
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In any new democratization of production - one that
draws in ideas of strategy, and purpose and innovation
- the whole process of popular planning will be
central, so will greater user power, extended workplace
democracy, economic newspapers, production
parliaments, and educational programmes in the skills
of planning. The point is not to create hard structures
where detailed targets are bargained over and imposed.
That is the mechanical model of planning. Rather the
point is the creation of a democratic economic culture,
where error is welcomed and ideas encouraged. It is an
open ended process, which guides micro detail as well
as macro strategy.
There is finally the question of 'the wage relation', that
is to say the terms and conditions of labour in the state.
The Weberian system has rendered many states a
prison for their employees, one which they cannot
afford to leave. In small countries with a restricted
hierarchy or scope for promotion, civil servants often
find themselves in their thirties with limited prospects
for further advancement, a narrow job description,
difficulties of transfer, yet the prison door kept fast byjob security and the state pension. In industry
ministries, officials tend to be confined to the office
(even in extension services), they are discouraged from
international travel, their scope for initiative is
minimal, their work culture encourages routine. When
structural changes are suggested, how often is it that
staff unions become the major objectors? They control
the status quo which can exact a rent from the future.
Privatization and sub contracting removes both job
security and rigidity but, as we have seen, in the context
of the new model it has drawbacks beyond the cutting
of wages. The new administration has to eliminate fear.
The forms of incentive and discipline are no longer
merely the wage and the sack. Weberian tenure and
promotion procedures depended on the avoidance of
mistakes - hence the bureaucratic aversion to risk.
What is now important is self-development, learning,
organizational culture, identification with the job, and
its results. If an organization has to sack someone it has
appointed then it has failed. And if the fear of the sack
becomes central to a workforce then a common creativity
will not be possible. There is much to be said for what
might be called the Swedish bargain: security for
flexibility. A project culture rather than a role culture
depends on flexibility - as too does learning.
Public administrations also have an interest in their
employees working outside the office, with those they
serve, with others who serve, in contexts which will
allow them to see their own sork in a different light.
Sabbaticals, part-time contracts, placements,
exchanges, courses, retainers - would all be part of the
portfolio job, as against the exclusive job which was
such a feature of Weber's model. The core organization
would remain just that - a core of security.
Thirdly, class divisions within state employment need
to be dissolved, and the range of the hierarchy lowered.
There should be no break in the line say between nurse
and doctor, or between executive and professional.
There will of course be examinations and qualifications
to be obtained - just as there are within nursing - but
the grading system should be continuous. Similarly
marks of distinction should be reduced. The Japanese
electronics firm NEC does not take on suppliers in the
US if it finds separate cafeterias or washrooms for
managers and staff. A similar principle should hold
within the state.
I have discussed a number of key difficulties faced by
public as against private mechanical forms of
administration; their closure, the insulation from users,
their monopoly, their lack of market prices for
accounting for outputs, the administrative implications
of the particular kind of political accountability
(representative democracy), and the terms of the labour
contract. The market alternative seeks to address these
problems by transforming public into private admini-
stration. My argument is different. It is that by
considering the corporate alternatives to private
bureaucracies, we can restructure public administration
so that it can more effectively, and democratically,
carry out its productive and developmental tasks. The
points I made with respect to private post-Taylorean
administration apply equally to the state: opening up
the system, moving from planning to strategy,
flattening the hierarchies and increasing horizontal
connectedness, decentralizing, pluralizing, multi-
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NEW FORMS AND DEVELOPMENT
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of a new model. It has been the purpose of this article to
make the connection. In the study and practice of
development the shadow of Weber is still with us. The
neo-liberal alternative casts its own shade. What
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